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The Impact of Firm Ownership, Board Monitoring on Operating Performance of 
        Chinese Mergers & Acquisitions 
         by 
    Agyenim Boateng, Xiaogang Bi & Sanjukta Brahma 
 
Abstracts: 
In this paper, we employ board monitoring mechanisms and within-firm governance 
variables to investigate the operating performance of 340 mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) in China over the 2004-2011 period. Our results document a significant 
deterioration in post-acquisition operating performance of acquiring firms over 12-36 
months. We find independent directors, managerial shareholding, ownership 
concentration have a positive and significant impact on operating performance of 
acquiring firms. However, the related party transactions exert a negative and 
significant effect on matched control adjusted ROA. Further analysis of our 
sub-sample indicates that privately owned enterprises (POEs) are better monitors 
compared to the state owned enterprises (SOEs).  
      
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, the performance of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in 
emerging countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) has received a 
considerable attention in the academic milieu (see Du and Boateng, 2015; Bertrand 
and Betschinger, 2012; Gubbi et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2015; Bhabra and Huang, 2013; 
Styahl and Voigt, 2008; Boateng, Wang and Yang, 2008). A review article published 
by Du and Boateng (2012) found that the past empirical efforts have focused on the 
most commonly studied antecedents of post-acquisition performance such as firm- 
and industry-specific variables and more recently on the effects of institutional factors. 
Relatively, few studies have examined the effects of within-firm governance and 
board monitoring mechanisms on M&A performance in emerging market context. Yet, 
prior research indicates that the poor returns to acquirers arise from governance 
problems resulting from managers being insufficiently accountable to shareholders 
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(Gorannova, Dharwadkar and Brandes, 2010).  
In this paper, we employ two board monitoring mechanisms (independent 
directors and CEO duality) and within-firm governance (managerial ownership, 
ownership concentration and related party transactions) to investigate the operating 
performance of M&A in an emerging country context. Three reasons motivate the 
examination of the effects of within-firm governance and board characteristics on 
M&A performance in emerging country context. First, M&A are discrete events that 
can substantially change the value of the firm (Sirower, 1997). Masulis, Wang and Xie 
(2007) argue that M&A are among the largest and most readily observable forms of 
corporate investment thereby making acquisitions ideal for testing the role and 
effectiveness of corporate governance systems on M&A outcomes.  
 
Second, Jensen (1986) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that acquisitions 
exacerbate the conflict of interest between senior managers and shareholders in public 
companies. Thus the agency theory explanation of M&A emphasizes that the market 
for corporate control may yield sizable personal gains for managers at the expense of 
shareholders because managers who initiated the transaction may have goals different 
from shareholders (Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). 
Moreover, M&A, as an important managerial initiative, are subject to a board’s 
scrutiny of which independent directors play a critical role (Hagendorff, Collins and 
Keasey, 2010). The monitoring role of the board is therefore crucial given that the 
agency theory suggests that CEOs are self-serving and if not monitored may engage 
in actions which are detrimental to shareholder wealth maximization (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The above is against the backdrop that owners and/or managers in 
emerging economy firms, particularly in China and India, often view board 
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independence as a mere statutory requirement and attempt to fulfill it by appointing 
people who consider their role as ceremonial (Singh and Gaur, 2009; Dahya et al. 
2003; Wang, 2007). According to Singh and Gaur (2009), the principle of board 
independence is thus followed only in letters and not in spirit. Emerging countries 
lack control mechanisms, as mergers and acquisition laws and the firm’s internal 
governance mechanisms remain weak (Peng, 2004; Khanna and Palepu, 2000).  
 
Lastly, another important driving force behind this study is the concentrated nature 
of the ownership structures of emerging country firms unlike firms in the United 
States which are widely dispersed (see La Porta et al., 1999; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; 
Morck et al., 2005). Many firms in emerging countries, predominantly, have single 
large shareholders (mostly state owned enterprises) who exercise ultimate control 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). The concentrated ownership creates 
agency problems, affects the behaviour of shareholders with implications for a firm’s 
long-term performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 1997). Conceptually, concentrated 
ownership may improve performance by increasing monitoring and alleviating 
free-rider problem in takeovers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In similar vein, the 
corporate governance literature raises the possibility that large shareholders may also 
exercise their control rights to create private benefits for themselves (Young et al., 
2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The above suggests that the effects of ownership 
concentration on firm performance are theoretically complex and empirically 
ambiguous. Moreover, the unique context of corporate governance in emerging 
countries raises important empirical questions on how the governance arrangements 
found in emerging countries affect M&A performance. According to Judge et al. 
(2008), the corporate governance systems in emerging countries do not only make it 
4 
 
more difficult to govern organizations, but also make standard corporate governance 
practices less legitimate. It is therefore a timely endeavor to shed lights on how 
corporate governance systems in emerging countries impact on M&A performance. 
 
China appears suitable for this research for the following reasons. China, as the 
largest emerging country, shares all the governance characteristics identified above, 
i.e., concentrated ownership; weak corporate governance system and corporate board 
just like other emerging countries (Firth, et al. 2006; Singh and Gaur, 2009; Dahya et 
al. 2003). Moreover, over the past decade, M&A activities by Chinese firms have 
paralleled China’s economic reforms including corporate governance reforms and its 
integration into the world economy. According to Hong Kong based GTA (2012), 
approximately 23,750 M&A transactions occurred over the period of 1998-2011 in 
mainland China. The data availability therefore makes the investigation of the effects 
of corporate governance mechanisms on M&A performance in China, which has been 
ignored due to paucity of data, a viable one. We do so by utilizing the accounting 
based performance metric in line with the recommendation by Healy, Palepu and 
Ruback (1992) who suggested that the use of accounting based measures, such as 
return on asset (ROA), as opposed to market based measures such as cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) to examine the acquisition performance. ROA reflects the 
synergies and operational efficiency obtained from M&A in the long-run 
(Ramaswamy and Waegelein, 2003; Hitt et al., 1998; Healy et al., 1992). This paper 
contributes to the M&A performance discourse by applying agency theory, especially 
within-firm governance and monitoring mechanisms in the largest emerging country. 
From a theoretical standpoint, we extend the effects of within-firm governance and 
board structure on M&A highlighting the monitoring function of the board in an 
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environment where corporate governance is weak yet has seen massive economic and 
enterprise reforms over the last two and a half decades. 
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following way. The next section 
reviews briefly literature on corporate governance and M&A performance and 
develops the hypotheses of the study. Section three describes the data and 
methodology used in this study. Section four comprises of the results and discussions 
followed by section five containing the conclusion of the study. 
 
2. Firm Governance and M&A Performance 
Prior literature suggests that most M&A fail to add value or contribute to the 
financial well-being of the firm (Ghosh, 2001; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989). 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1988), one dominant explanation of the inability of 
M&A to improve post event performance may be due to agency problem, i.e. 
divergence of interests between managers and shareholders. The studies by DeLong 
and DeYoung (2007) and Pilloff (1996) report that, while bidding shareholders tend to 
destroy value in M&A, managers of the bidding firms benefit from higher prestige 
and increased remuneration packages in the post-merger period (Anderson et al., 2004; 
Bliss and Rosen, 2001). The above is consistent with the managerialism hypothesis 
which states that managers of bidding firms pursue personal objectives other than 
maximization of shareholder value (Jensen, 1986). Several authors, such as Amihud 
and Lev (1981); Morck et al. (1990) have rendered support suggesting that some 
M&A are primarily motivated by managerial self-interest. In this paper, we 
hypothesize that managerial ownership, ownership concentration and appointment of 
independent directors will ameliorate agency conflict in two ways: first, by aligning 
managerial interests to that of shareholders; and second the presence of independent 
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directors and ownership concentration increases the monitoring mechanism in the 
firm thereby enhancing post acquisition performance. We also argue that CEO duality 
may lead to positive post acquisition performance in that duality leads to swift and 
decisive takeover decisions to avoid the acquisition becoming hostile and costly 
exercise. We discuss below the hypotheses of the study in the next section. 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
3.1 Independent Directors and Performance 
The board of directors in public companies has a responsibility for ratifying and 
monitoring managerial initiatives on behalf of shareholders (Hilman and Dalziel, 
2003). Agency theory suggests that the above task is facilitated by a board whose 
composition reflects a greater proportion of outside independent directors since such 
composition could represent a more effective way in monitoring and controlling 
managerial actions (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). M&A are major investment that may 
change the strategic direction of a firm and the presence of independent directors may 
be particularly important in influencing and monitoring the proposed acquisition, 
resolving the conflicts of interests among decision makers and shareholders. However, 
prior studies on the effects of independent director on firm’s performance have 
produced mixed results. For example, Pearce and Zahra (1992); Millstein and 
MacAvoy (1998) document a positive correlation between the proportion of 
independent directors and a firm financial performance. On the other hand, Duchin, 
Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) point out that the effectiveness of independent directors 
is limited by the inferior information they have about company activities, its resources 
and capabilities, and the complexities associated with the functioning of the firm.  
In context of emerging countries such as China, Chung, Judge and Li (2015) point out 
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that a board of directors tends to play effective advisory role and may not adequately 
monitor the behavior of top managers. This is because owners and managers in 
emerging country firms often view board independence as a mere statutory 
requirement and attempt to fulfill it by appointing people who consider their role as 
ceremonial (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Moreover, Lin et al. (1998) suggest that the 
board members in China are insiders and are more effective as advisors. It is 
important to note that, the studies of Dharwadkar et al. (2000), Khanna and Palepu 
(2000) were carried out before the reforms in role of independent directors in 2001 
and 2003. Given the extensive nature of the reforms regarding the role of independent 
directors in Chinese firms (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008), we expect that 
independent directors have a positive and significant effect on operating performance. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: The appointment of independent directors will be positively associated 
with M&A performance in China 
 
3.2 CEO Duality and Performance 
The relationship between CEO duality and firm performance has been widely 
researched but the empirical results have been mixed and inconclusive (Rhoades et al., 
2001; Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005; Pi and Timme, 1993). At one end of the spectrum, 
it is argued that CEO duality leads to the concentration of power in the hands of one 
person, restricts board independence and curtails the board’s monitoring effectiveness 
(Mallette and Fowler, 1992). Fama and Jensen (1983) reinforce this point and assert 
that duality is an indication of the absence of separation of decision management and 
control, thus making it difficult for insecure directors to be honest when evaluating 





On the other hand, researchers such as Anderson and Anthony (1986) argue that 
duality leads to superior firm performance as it allows precise leadership for purposes 
of strategy formulation and implementation which should result in better 
organisational performance. Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) point out that duality 
removes any internal and external ambiguity regarding responsibility for firm 
processes and outcomes. This may be important in M&A decisions where quick and 
decisive action are important to avoid delays which may result in hostile and costly 
takeover with a potential of destroying firm value. We therefore hypothesize that:   
Hypothesis 2: CEO duality is positively related to the operating performance of 
Chinese M&A. 
 
3.3 Managerial Ownership and Performance 
  The agency theory contends that the delegation of managerial responsibilities by 
shareholders to managers requires the presence of mechanisms that align the interest 
of shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One key mechanism 
advocated by the agency perspective is the incentive alignment through managerial 
ownership and stock options (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Murthy, 1999). Morck et al. 
(1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) document a 
significant effect of insider ownership on corporate performance. In the context of 
China, the 2001 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies recognizes the 
use of cash incentive-based bonus pay and more recently share option as means of 
incentivizing managers to align the interests of managers and shareholders (Firth et al., 
2006). Consistent to the agency theory logic, we expect the owner-managers to give 
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off their best to improve performance and consequently get a higher return. Therefore, 
in taking M&A decisions, Chinese owner-managers are more likely to consider the 
long-term performance as an overriding factor rather than managerial self-interest as 
suggested by the empire building theory of M&A. In the light of the above, it is 
hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 3: Managerial ownership in China will lead to positive M&A operating 
performance. 
 
3.4 Ownership Concentration 
Grossman and Hart (1986) argue that shareholders with a large stake in the 
company show more willingness to play an active role in corporate decisions because 
they partially internalize the benefits of their monitoring effort. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) echo similar view and indicate that the presence of large shareholders, i.e., 
blockholders helps in disciplining the erring managers and improves performance, 
even when there may not be enough legal protection. The positive effect of ownership 
concentration on firm performance can be explained by efficient monitoring, which 
assumes that higher concentration gives large shareholders stronger incentives and 
greater power to monitor management at lower cost.  
In the context of emerging countries, state is often the dominant owner (Liu and 
Sun, 2005). It may be argued that state may have different goals such as increase 
employment to reduce social instability rather than profitability (Xu and Wang, 1999). 
However, empirical evidence in emerging countries such as China (Qi, Wu and Zheng, 
2000; Xu and Wang, 1999); India (Ramaswamy, Li and Veliyath, 2002); Singapore 
(Ang and Ding, 2006) and Russia (Buck et al., 1999) have rendered support to the 
positive relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance. 
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Moreover, with substantial improvements in the governance environment and 
enterprise reforms in China in recent years, it seems plausible that large shareholders 
are effective monitors. We hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4: Ownership concentration will be positively associated with M&A 
performance in China 
 
3.5 Related party transaction 
In addition to the above hypotheses, we formulate a hypothesis in respect of 
related-party transactions and operating performance. Previous research shows that 
controlling shareholders use related party transactions to extract resources for private 
benefits (tunneling) at the expense of other shareholders (see Jian and Wong, 2010; 
Jiang, Lee, and Yue, 2010). The prevalence of tunneling activities using related party 
transactions in China are well documented (Cheung et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2010). 
Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010) suggest that the severity of tunneling is due to the 
inadequacy of the existing laws on legal protection for minority shareholders in China 
and other emerging countries. Based on prior research, we use related party 
transaction as a proxy for the extent of agency conflicts. We hypothesize that firms 
with larger values of related-party transactions have more agency conflicts and would 
result in poor performance in that severe agency leads higher cost and lower 
profitability. This leads to last hypothesis: 
H5: Related party transactions will be negatively associated with M&A performance 
 
3.6 Control Variables 
Regarding the control variables, prior studies (e.g. Du, Boateng and Newton, 2016; 
Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Core et al., 2006; Boateng and Bi, 2014) suggest 
that acquirer size, acquirer over- or under- valuation, relatedness; leverage, cash 
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holding/reserves, method of payment, transaction value, and acquirer price run-up 
(pre-event 12 month buy and hold abnormal returns) are important variables that may 
affect performance of M&A. Therefore, we incorporate these factors as control 
variables. 
 
4. Data and Research Method  
4.1 Source of Data and Sample Selection 
The data for this study was obtained from the Chinese Stock Market Research 
(CSMAR) databases jointly produced by the University of Hong-Kong and GTA. The 
database covers governance and finance structure of listed Chinese mainland firms 
and Chinese firms engaged in M&As. The following restrictions were imposed in 
order to arrive at the final sample: (1) acquisition should be initiated and completed 
acquisitions over the period 2004-2011; (2) the transaction type includes mergers, 
tender offers, and acquisitions of major assets; (3) both acquirer and target are 
Chinese domestic firms, and acquirers are listed firms in Chinese mainland stock 
market; (3) the deal value has to be larger than 10 million RMB in order to eliminate 
the effect of very small deals. Moreover, the acquirers should have a controlling 
interest of the acquired firm; (4) the financial and utility sectors are excluded due to 
different financial reporting methods; (5) and lastly, we require firm-level accounting 
data to be available for up to three years prior and three after acquisition for each firm 
to allow a time sufficient for any potential economic gain to be realized. The above 
restrictions led to the final sample of 340. 
 
To measure the changes in operating performance, we compare the realized 
performance of the sample firms with the benchmark performance of non-acquisition 
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control firms. The use of matched control firm comparisons is consistent with Barber 
and Lyon (1996) who argue that research designs evaluating operating performance 
are well specified and powerful only when performance is compared to control firms 
that are matched to performance measures such as asset size, book to market value 
(BTMV), and adjusted to industry median. Following Barber and Lyon (1996); 
Sharma and Ho, (2002) we employ a match of sample firms involved in M&A by 
asset size, book to market value and industry and compare with non-acquisition firms 
using the matched control firm adjusted ROA. Prior studies suggest that comparison 
of operating performance of sample firms with matched control firms can be affected 
not only by the takeover but also by a host of other factors (see Sharma and Ho, 2002). 
To mitigate the problem and isolate the takeover event, this study adopts a selection 
process of non-M&A firms suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996); Loughran and 
Ritter (1997). First, we identify all non-M&A firms whose market capitalizations are 
within 0.7-1.3 of the acquiring firms’ market capitalization, and within this range, we 
select a firm whose BTMV ratio is the closest to the acquirer’s BTMV ratio. We also 
examine the performance differences between the sample firms and their non-merging 
peers prior and subsequent to the bid. A pair t-test to assess the goodness of the match 
was conducted and no significant difference was observed hence there was no need to 
search and replace any of the control firms. 
 
4.2 Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 reports the M&A event sample by year over the period of 2004-2011. The 
largest share of the acquisitions (19.71%) occurred in 2007, followed by 17.06% in 
2011 and 15.29% each in 2009 and 2006. The lowest number of events occurred in 
2008. Regarding the ownership type, SOEs account for 159 transactions (46.76%) 
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with POEs being 181 (53.23%).  
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
4.3 Variable Measurement 
Dependent Variable: Calculation  
Following Barber and Lyon (1996), the operating performance are estimated as 
difference between sample firms’ performance and control firms’ performance; where 
control is based on size and BTMV. The indicator of operating performance used in 
this study is ROA. ROA is defined as the EBTi,t  divided by the book value of assets 
of company i at time t, or ROAi,t = EBTi,t/BVi, t. The operating performance have been 
calculated for time period t = 12, 24 and 36 months following M&A. The estimation 
of statistical significance of the operating performance difference between sample 
M&A and control firm is verified by calculating Wilcoxon signed-rank sum test.  
The excess or abnormal operating performance is defined as the difference in the level 






ti CPPAOP ,,,                                        (1)                                           
 
In this equation tiP ,  is the mean level of performance of the sample M&A company i 
at time period t; 
j
tiCP ,  is the mean level of performance of the control firm for firm i 
at time t and j refers to different comparison groups used in this study, j = 1,2 (1 = size, 




tiAOP ,  represents the abnormal operating performance of 
                                                             
1
 Under comparison group 1 (that is, size), we estimate the operating performance by compare the 








firm i at time t.                                                
The manner in which the independent variables are measured is provided in Appendix 
A.  
4.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of acquirer characteristics. Panel A of the 
table shows that the leverage ratio for our sampled firms is 51.92%, comparing the 
above numbers to statistics reported in other studies (such as Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) and Booth et al. (2001), it is clear that Chinese firms have similar 
levels of leverage. The acquirers’ Tobin Q is about 1.67. Independent directors 
constitute about 36% of the board of directors. The mean scores for the number of 
related party transactions is from 18.7983.  
 
 
 [Insert Table 2 here please] 
 
Compared to the study by Wei et al. (2005), the sampled firms in this study has 
managerial ownership of about 3.9%, significantly higher than 0.015 reported in the 
study carried out by Wei et al. (2005) based on a sample of 5,284 firms for the 
1991-2001 period. The managerial ownership in our sample suggests that insider 
stock ownership in China is relatively large as a measure of ownership structure 
which can be used to align the conflicting interests between insiders and outside 
shareholders. Ownership concentration of top 5 shareholders is about 54%.  Panel B 
of table 2 also shows significant differences between SOEs and POEs in respect of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Under comparison group 2 (that is, book to market ratio), we estimate the operating performance by 











method of payment, acquirer Tobin’s Q, and cash reserves.  
 
4.5 Correlation Matrix 
The correlations among the variables used in the analyses are reported in Table 3. All 
the correlations are well below the threshold of 0.7 suggested by Hair et al. (2010). 
We further check multicollinearity and our variable inflation factor (VIF) estimation 
suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem in this study. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here please] 
 
5. Results and Discussions 
Table 4 reports significant changes in post acquisition of operating performance of 
sample firms relative to the benchmark control firms over 12, 24 and 36 months. The 
results indicate a significant deterioration in post-acquisition operating performance 
of acquiring firms over 12- 36 months. The Wilcoxon signed rank test indicates that 
decrease in median adjusted annual control-adjusted returns is significant at the 1% 
level. The results are in line with the studies of Dickerson et al. (1997) in the UK; and 
that of Clark and Ofek (1994) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) in the U.S. who 
find a negative and significant operating returns for acquiring firms in the context of 
developed countries. In the context of emerging countries, the negative returns 
documented in this study appear consistent with the results of Du, Boateng and 
Newton (2016) who employed buy and hold abnormal returns and calendar time 
abnormal returns (BHAR/CTAR) approaches and found a negative long-term returns 
for Chinese acquirers. However, it is important to point out that the results of the 
current study are at variance with the results of the studies of Rahman and Limmack 
16 
 
(2004); Edamura et al. (2014) who found that acquisitions lead to improvement in the 
long-term operating performance in Malaysia and China respectively.  
 
 
[Insert Table 4 here please] 
 
 
We report the results of six regression models for post acquisition operating 
performance of matched control firm for the whole sample in table 5. We enter the 
primary variables namely, independent director, related party transactions, managerial 
shareholding, CEO duality and ownership concentration successively with control 
variables in columns 1-5 respectively. Column 6 of table 5 reports both the primary 
and control variables. The regression models in columns 1, 3 and 5 suggest that 
independent directors, managerial shareholding and ownership concentration appear 
to influence the operating performance of Chinese M&A. The findings support 
hypotheses 1, 3 and 5. Column 2 indicates that related party transaction has a 
coefficient which is negative and significant suggesting that related party transaction 
exerts negative influence on operating performance and renders some support for 
hypothesis 5. However, column 4 documents that CEO duality has insignificant 
influence on operating performance and hence hypothesis 2 is unsupported. Column 6 
confirms the results that the independent directors, related party transaction and 
ownership concentration have a significant bearing on operating performance. The 
test statistics suggest the models are valid and explain the variations in the post 
acquisition performance. The adjusted R² for the matched control sample of adjusted 





[Insert Table 5 here please] 
 
 
The finding that concentrated ownership (mostly in the hands of SOEs) exerts 
positive and significant impact on M&A performance supports the assertion that 
ownership concentration provides an efficient way of resolving agency problems and 
consequently increases M&A performance (Claessens and Djankov, 1999; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1996; Xu and Wang, 1999). This is particularly relevant to countries with 
lower levels of investor protection (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1998; 
Denis and McConnell, 2003). As investor protection is relatively weak in China and 
other emerging countries, a higher ownership concentration may substitute for the 
absence of strong external governance (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Moreover, in the 
context of M&A, large shareholders tend to have voting control which can be used to 
put some pressure on the firm by threatening takeover which may lead to the 
displacement of senior management. Such pressures are important for resolving 
agency problems and increasing firm value as costs associated with agency are 
reduced
2
. The results appear consistent with the findings of Khanna and Palepu (2000) 
in the Indian context where ownership concentration which is in the hands of business 
groups have a positive and significant impact on performance. It is important to point 
out that, the ownership in both China and other emerging countries is dominated by 
SOEs and Business groups respectively suggesting that such ownership is positively 
                                                             
2 Failure of internal governance of firms may activate an external control device – called market for corporate 
control first conceptualized by Manne (1965). This market involves takeovers of firms that have failed to make 




related to performance. For example, SOEs and business groups can facilitate access 
to capital, labour and political power structure less expensively and draw from richer 
pool of opportunities than non-group peers thereby impacting positively on firm 
profitability in emerging countries (see Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Khanna and Palepu, 
2000). Our results therefore support the contention that, notwithstanding the 
differences between SOE and business groups, the concentration of ownership in the 
hands SOEs and business groups has a benefit of reducing transaction costs in 
emerging countries thereby leading to shareholder wealth maximization. 
 Regarding the independent directors, our findings suggest that the corporate 
governance reforms in China have a positive impact on M&A performance. The 
findings indicate that the extensive reforms which started in 1993, followed by a 
formal and comprehensive guidelines specifying the role of independent directors in 
2001 have gone a long way to improve the monitoring function of independent 
directors. The results support the findings of Choi et al. (2007) who found the 
proportion of outside directors to exert a positive and significant influence on the 
performance of Korean firms. The findings, however, are contrary to the conclusions 
drawn in previously studies such as Dharwadkar et al. (2000); Knowledge@Wharton 
(2007) which indicate that independent directors in emerging economies are 
ineffective, lack resources and are likely to perform advisory role than the oversight 
role. The findings are also at variance with the findings of the previous studies in 
developed countries where the presence of independent directors have been found to 
have an insignificant effect on performance (see Choi et al., 2007). Perhaps, the 
difference between our results and that of developed country firm performance may 
be explained by the level of institutional quality and the extent of corporate 
governance development in developed countries compared with emerging countries. 
19 
 
We therefore support the conclusion drawn by Choi et al. (2007) that the effect of 
independent directors on firm performance depends on the nature of market 
conditions in which they operate.  
We also find that the related party transactions have a negative coefficient and 
significant effect on the operating performance. Perhaps, this finding may be 
explained by the concentrated nature of ownership and weak minority protection 
rights in China which make agency problem between the controlling and minority 
shareholders more severe among Chinese firms (see Jiang et al., 2010; Qian and 
Yeung, 2014). Thus it is argued that ownership concentration and weak protection for 
minority shareholders allow controlling shareholders to transfer assets or profits out 
of the firm for private benefits through related party transactions thereby exerting a 
negative effect on operating performance. The results that managerial ownership has 
positive and significant impact on M&A performance suggest that managerial 
ownership helps align the interests of managers to that of the shareholder and lead to 
better operating performance for Chinese firms. CEO duality appears to be 
statistically insignificant and therefore hypothesis 2 is unsupported. 
Now we turn our attention to the control variables, our results suggest that, cash as 
a method of payment, transaction value, cash holding, leverage and acquirer Tobin’s 
Q (growth opportunities) have positive and significant impact on the operating 
performance of Chinese M&A. However, the acquiring firm size and acquirer run-up 
have negative and significant influence on operating performance. The finding that 
cash holding has significant impact on operating performance is interesting suggesting 
that managers of cash-rich firms often benefit from having cash reserve which cost 
less than external financing to fund large projects thereby leading to better M&A 
performance (Sun and Tong, 2003). However, this finding is at variance with the 
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widely held concerns that large cash holdings reduce disciplinary pressure on 
managers and tempt them to spend cash on value destroying acquisitions (Hartford, 
1999). Leverage appears to have a positive and significant influence on operating 
performance and this finding is consistent with the standard capital structure theory, 
which predicts a higher default risk and thus higher ROA for firms of higher leverage. 
The findings also suggest that acquirer’s growth opportunities, cash as a method of 
payment and transaction value impact on operating performance are consistent to 
most of previous studies. The finding that firm size has a negative and significant 
impact appears consistent with the findings of Sun and Tong (2003) who find that 
large Chinese firms tend to suffer from more agency problems resulting in agency 
costs with negative effect on operating performance.  
 
5.2 Further Analysis: SOEs versus POEs 
As state ownership is an important feature in China, we conduct further analysis by 
dividing the sample into state owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned 
enterprises (POEs). It is argued that SOEs tend to be politically rather than 
commercially motivated, which may lead to poor operating performance. Moreover, 
the government socio-economic and political objectives might lead to soft budget 
constraints and provide some support for state controlled firms (Chow and Fung, 1998; 
Poncet et al., 2010). Soft budget constraints may provide easier access to external 
finance for these firms (Allen et al., 2005), hence ownership type of firms affects the 
M&A performance (Zhou et al., 2015). We therefore investigate the ownership 
type-performance relationship of the sample firms. Tables 6 and 7 report the results of 
the sub samples in respect of SOEs and POEs. For SOEs, columns 3 and 6 of table 6 
show that managerial ownership appears to have significant bearing on M&A 
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operating performance. However, columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 indicate that independent 
director, related party transaction, CEO duality and ownership concentration have 
insignificant influence on operating performance.  
 
         [Insert Table 6 here please] 
 
In contrast, independent director and ownership concentration reported in columns 1, 
5 and 6 of table 7 respectively appear to influence the operating performance of the 
POEs. 
The results indicate that ownership concentration appears to influence the 
performance of POEs. The results suggest that ownership concentration in the hands 
of the private firms lead to better performance than SOEs confirming the predominant 
notion in the literature that state ownership leads to poor performance. The results 
may be attributed to the fact that POEs are efficient and strong monitors due to the 
high quality and calibre of people appointed to the role of independent directors.  
 
 
[Insert Table 7 here please] 
 
 
Another interesting findings from our analysis document that independent 
directors exert significant influence on the performance of POEs compared to that of 
SOEs. The results may be explained by the nature and differences of resources and 
capabilities available to the POEs relative to SOEs. For example, unlike SOEs whose 
directors may owe their positions through political connections, independent directors 
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in POEs may be appointed on the basis of their qualifications, competence, experience 
and capacity to perform the monitoring role associated with the position thereby 
influencing operating performance. The above explanation therefore is in line with the 
view of Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) who argue that the effectiveness of 
independent directors may be limited by their lack of capacity and the unavailability 
of resources to carry out their mandate.  
 
Robustness Tests 
To check the robustness of our models, we employed additional measures to rule out 
alternative explanations. As a further check of our results, we explore an alternative 
measure of operating performance using adjusted ROA for 24 and 36 months using 
book-to-market ratios. Similarly, we use matched size and industry measure of 
operating performance for further check. The results of all the additional measures are 
similar and confirm our results obtained in tables 4, 5 and 6. To conserve a space, we 
report the results of operating performance using book-to-market ratio for 24 months 
in table 8.  
 
  




This paper employs board monitoring mechanisms and within-firm governance to 
investigate the operating performance of 340 M&As in China. This paper reports 
some interesting and significant results. First, we find that ownership concentration 
23 
 
has a positive and significant impact on operating performance of Chinese acquiring 
firms. The results therefore provide support for hypothesis 4. The results suggest that 
a higher ownership concentration provides incentive and greater power to monitor the 
actions of the managers efficiently and improve the operating performance of Chinese 
M&A. Moreover, ownership concentration may be used as a substitute for the absence 
of strong external governance in countries where investor protection is relatively 
weak such as China as pointed out by Dharwadkar et al. (2000). Second, we find that 
independent directors exert a positive and significant influence on operating 
performance suggesting that the extensive reforms carried out in respect of 
independent directors in 1993 and reinforced in 2001 with comprehensive guidelines 
specifying the role of independent directors has improved the monitoring function of 
independent directors and performance of Chinese firms. The findings that related 
party transactions are negatively related to operating performance suggest tunneling 
via related party transactions by controlling shareholders thus rendering support for 
the findings of Jiang et al. (2010); Qian and Yeung (2014). We therefore conclude that 
in an environment where the protection for minority shareholders is weak, agency 
problem between the controlling and minority shareholders appears more severe 
resulting in the expropriation of firm’s assets for private benefits and poor 
performance. The study also finds CEO duality not to have statistically significant 
while managerial shareholding appears to have a mixed impact on operating 
performance. 
 
We carried out further analysis by dividing the sample into SOEs and POEs. Our 
results indicate that the ownership concentration and independent directors appear to 
influence the performance of POEs while managerial shareholding has a positive and 
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significant bearing on SOEs. The results appear interesting and indicate that 
ownership concentration in the hands of the POEs plays a stronger monitoring role in 
the performance of Chinese M&As. We conclude that the positive effect may be due 
to the appointment of independent directors with requisite skills and capabilities as 
independent directors in POEs compared to those of SOEs whose appointments are 
more likely to be based on political connections or membership of communist party, 
particularly in China. The implication is that POEs appear to be effective monitors 
compared to SOEs (who tends to have more cash resources due to soft budget 
constraints) in China and hence better performance. The results appear consistent with 
prior research studies (e.g., Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005) which conclude that 
state ownership is harmful to firm performance. Another important implication is that 
effective monitoring does not dependent only on the availability of financial resources 
to the firm but critically depend on the skills and capabilities of the independent 
directors. The nature of resources such as experience and human resource capabilities 
of directors play a critical role on board effectiveness. 
Despite the contribution of this study to M&A performance discourse by applying 
agency theory, the study has a limitation. Almost all targets in our sample are “private” 
targets, thus, we do not have a complete data to measure and control overpayment (if 
any) made by the acquiring firms. We suggest that future studies should investigate 
the effects of board monitoring and within-firm governance mechanisms on long-term 
performance of BRIC countries using both stock market- and accounting-based 
approaches. Such studies should also consider controlling for the effects of acquirer 
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Table 1: Event Sample Summary (by event year and ownership type) 
 
  All      SOE      POE 
Year N % N    % N   % 
2004 26 7.65% 18 11.32% 8 4.42% 
2005 26 7.65% 17 10.69% 9 4.97% 
2006 52 15.29% 28 17.61% 24 13.26% 
2007 67 19.71% 33 20.75% 34 18.78% 
2008 25 7.35% 13 8.18% 12 6.63% 
2009 52 15.29% 23 14.47% 29 16.02% 
2010 34 10.00% 11 6.92% 23 12.71% 
2011 58 17.06% 16 10.06% 42 23.20% 




Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Variable summary statistics 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min Med Max 
Corporate Governance Variables 
Independent Directors 340 0.3593 0.0527 0.2000 0.3333 0.6667 
Related Party Transactions  340 18.7983 23.7100 0.0000 11.0000 191.0000 
Managerial Ownership 340 0.0390 0.1264 0.0000 0.0000 0.7365 
CEO Duality  340 0.1930 0.3951 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Ownership concentration  340 53.8753 16.1298 21.4600 54.8700 99.7300 
Operating Performance Variables 
Adjusted ROA12 Months 340 -0.0134 0.1865 -0.2938 -0.0397 0.7842 
Adjusted ROA24 Months 340 -0.0281 0.1612 -0.3028 -0.0394 0.4648 
Deal and Firm Characteristics 
Cash Payment 340 0.9106 0.2856 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Transaction Value 340 0.1015 0.4364 0.0103 0.0314 1.7217 
Acquirer Size  340 14.6838 0.9722 12.7957 14.6327 17.2865 
Acquirer Tobin Q 340 1.6732 1.4629 0.7003 1.2835 6.2348 
Acquirer Price Run-up 340 0.0831 0.6885 -1.3536 -0.0051 2.9710 
Acquirer Leverage 340 0.5192 0.3618 0.0363 0.5089 1.8788 
Acquirer Cash Holding 340 0.2062 0.1545 0.0022 0.1683 0.7755 
Relatedness 340 0.0187 0.1356 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Note: This table reports the number, mean, standard deviations, min, median and max of corporate 
governance variables, operating performance variables and acquirer and deal characteristics. See 
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Appendix A for the detailed definition of variables. 
 
                 
 




Variable SOE   POE  Difference p-value 
Adjusted ROA 12 Months -0.0437 0.0132 -0.0569 0.0049 
Adjusted ROA 24 Months -0.0383 -0.019 -0.0193 0.2671 
Cash Payment 0.9400 0.8794 0.0606 0.0277 
Transaction Value 0.1024 0.1023 0.0001 0.9980 
Acquirer Size (log) 14.7505 14.6287 0.1218 0.1923 
Acquirer Tobin Q 1.4112 1.896 -0.4848 0.0005 
Acquirer Price Run-up 0.0513 0.0975 -0.0462 0.4871 
Acquirer Leverage 0.5339 0.5181 0.0158 0.6475 




























Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
    A B C D E F G  H  I J K   L       M 
A. Adjusted ROA 12 Months 1 
            B. Independent Directors  0.1665** 1 
           C. Related Party Transactions  -0.0653 -0.0182 1 
          D. Managerial Ownership -0.0114 0.0281 -0.0845 1 
         E. CEO Duality  -0.0277 0.0046 -0.0330 0.1694** 1 
        F. Ownership concentration 0.0518 -0.0800 0.0160 0.1384* 0.0456 1 
       G. Cash Payment -0.0888 -0.1585** 0.1300* 0.0308 -0.0374 0.1005 1 
      H. Transaction Value 0.1833*** 0.0910 -0.0836 -0.0405 0.0230 -0.0651 -0.4076*** 1 
     I. Acquirer Size  -0.1408* -0.0151 0.3702*** 0.1448** 0.0261 0.1461** 0.1113* -0.2195*** 1 
    J. Acquirer Tobin Q ratio 0.1645** 0.1723** -0.0759 0.0892 0.2062*** -0.1838*** -0.1437** 0.0460 0.2391*** 1 
   K Acquirer Price Run-up -0.1153* -0.0980 -0.0077 -0.0231 0.0842 -0.0142 0.1994*** -0.1420** 0.0537 0.1023 1 
  L Acquirer Leverage 0.5601*** -0.0008  0.1056 -0.2181*** -0.1589** -0.1128* -0.0634 0.1197* -0.1446** -0.0980 0.0625 1 
 M. Acquirer Cash Holding -0.1729** 0.0071 -0.0713 0.2741*** 0.0227 0.1360* 0.0113 -0.0795 0.1489** 0.0285 -0.0582 -0.4524*** 
 N. Relatedness  -0.0186 -0.0196 -0.0841 -0.0381 -0.0099 0.0501 0.0444 -0.0247 -0.0658 -0.0127 -0.0530 -0.0634 0.0242 
 










Table 4: Results on Operating Performance (Return on Asset) 
 
  Size-matched B/M Matched       Industry Matched 
 
    
12 Months -7.3% (9.46***) -2.8% (78.78***)      -3.1% (69.18***) 
24 Months -8.7% (10.7***) -3.6% (84.49***)      -3.6% (51.36***) 
36 Months -7.8% (9.7***) -2.3%  (5.7***)       -7.4% (6.18***) 
   
Notes: This table shows the average difference in operating performance of the sample firms  
and control firms (controlled by size and B/M ratio). The post-merger operating performance 
has been calculated for the time period of 12, 24 and 36 months following M&A completion.  
The statistical significance is measured by Wilcoxon signed rank test.  
The z score are shown in the parentheses.  
 ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 































Note: This table presents the relation between the operating performance and firm corporate 
governance. The dep. Variable is match firms adjusted ROA. Variable definitions are reported in 
Appendix A; Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity; p-values in parentheses; * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05;*** p<0.01. 
Table 6: Corporate Governance and Abnormal Operating Performance (SOE Samples) 
All Samples (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  DV: Adj. ROA12M 
Primary Variables: 
   Independent Directors 0.3007*** 




    
(0.0091) 
Related Party Transactions  
 
-0.0011** 

























    
0.0022*** 0.0022** 
     
(0.0082) (0.0120) 
Control Variables: 
     Cash Payment 0.0551 0.0534 0.0442 0.0464 0.0519 0.0628* 
 
(0.1236) (0.1257) (0.1901) (0.1686) (0.1306) (0.0830) 
Transaction Value 0.0344** 0.0362** 0.0336** 0.0335** 0.0328** 0.0350*** 
 
(0.0242) (0.0192) (0.0362) (0.0365) (0.0177) (0.0088) 
Acquirer Size (log) -0.0135* -0.0034 -0.0154** -0.0154** -0.0238*** -0.0114 
 
(0.0861) (0.6816) (0.0460) (0.0466) (0.0025) (0.1540) 
Acquirer Tobin Q ratio 0.0511** 0.0484** 0.0548*** 0.0527** 0.0623*** 0.0556** 
 
(0.0125) (0.0160) (0.0082) (0.0133) (0.0053) (0.0114) 
Acquirer price run-up -0.0383*** -0.0396*** -0.0410*** -0.0407*** -0.0432*** -0.0409*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.4540*** 0.4603*** 0.4525*** 0.4522*** 0.4578*** 0.4718*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Acquirer Cash Holding 0.1454** 0.1373** 0.1374** 0.1537** 0.1392** 0.1152* 
 
(0.0458) (0.0424) (0.0477) (0.0354) (0.0451) (0.0802) 
Relatedness 0.0465 0.0426 0.0472 0.0480 0.0331 0.0304 
 
(0.1303) (0.1958) (0.1366) (0.1362) (0.2627) (0.3080) 
_cons -0.3226* -0.3241* -0.1748 -0.1765 -0.1646 -0.4545** 
 
(0.0609) (0.0758) (0.2466) (0.2451) (0.2585) (0.0128) 
N 334 339 339 338 339 333 
Adj. R-sq 0.4567 0.4559 0.4477 0.4435 0.4718 0.4897 
Ind Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




SOE Samples (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  DV: Adj. ROA12M 
Corporate Governance Variables 
      Independent Director 0.1927 





   
 
(0.2424) 
































    
0.0007 0.0007 
     
(0.3804) (0.3510) 
Control Variables 
      Cash Payment 0.0024 0.0062 0.0090 0.0100 0.0179 -0.0015 
 
(0.9256) (0.7802) (0.6917) (0.6630) (0.4984) (0.9533) 
Transaction Value 0.0540** 0.0569** 0.0573*** 0.0573*** 0.0544** 0.0489** 
 
(0.0214) (0.0153) (0.0057) (0.0093) (0.0105) (0.0360) 
Acquirer Size (log) 0.0045 0.0002 0.0046 0.0041 0.0004 -0.0034 
 
(0.5766) (0.9723) (0.5512) (0.6007) (0.9514) (0.6306) 
Acquirer Tobin Q ratio 0.0148 0.0169 0.0182 0.0153 0.0179 0.0220 
 
(0.2334) (0.2158) (0.1597) (0.2393) (0.2048) (0.1226) 
Acquirer price run-up -0.0244** -0.0247** -0.0279** -0.0244** -0.0251** -0.0290** 
 
(0.0279) (0.0400) (0.0205) (0.0306) (0.0369) (0.0163) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.1795*** 0.1593*** 0.1757*** 0.1708*** 0.1682*** 0.1698*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0006) 
Acquirer Cash Holding -0.0047 0.0125 -0.0332 0.0192 0.0198 -0.0777 
 
(0.9482) (0.8682) (0.6524) (0.7995) (0.7909) (0.2659) 
Relatedness 0.0299 0.0259 0.0288 0.0289 0.0222 0.0196 
 
(0.4541) (0.4979) (0.4741) (0.4711) (0.5533) (0.6020) 
Intercept -0.2342 -0.1248 -0.1889 -0.1629 -0.1433 -0.2362 
 
(0.2144) (0.2411) (0.1105) (0.2373) (0.2704) (0.1139) 
Ind Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 154 159 159 158 159 153 
Adj. R-sq 0.3020 0.2793 0.3062 0.2736 0.2841 0.3375 
 
Note: This table presents the relation between the operating performance and firm corporate 
governance (SOE Sample). The dep. Variable is match firms adjusted ROA. Variable definitions are 
reported in Appendix A; Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity; p-values in parentheses; 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05;*** p<0.01. 




Private Firms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  DV: Adj. ROA12M 
Corporate Governance Variables 
     Independent Directors 0.5042** 





   
 
(0.0166) 
































    
0.0034** 0.0030** 
     
(0.0208) (0.0408) 
Control Variables 
      Cash Payment 0.0976** 0.0760* 0.0720 0.0751 0.0634 0.0863** 
 
(0.0409) (0.0973) (0.1205) (0.1031) (0.1275) (0.0399) 
Transaction Value 0.0143 0.0053 0.0048 0.0029 0.0078 0.0123 
 
(0.5648) (0.8294) (0.8464) (0.9053) (0.7269) (0.6016) 
Acquirer Size (log) -0.0041 -0.0038 -0.0144 -0.0155 -0.0288* -0.0135 
 
(0.8194) (0.8197) (0.4153) (0.3777) (0.0762) (0.4166) 
Acquirer Tobin Q ratio 0.0602** 0.0605** 0.0677** 0.0645** 0.0811*** 0.0685** 
 
(0.0262) (0.0271) (0.0126) (0.0207) (0.0072) (0.0281) 
Acquirer price run-up -0.0418** -0.0416** -0.0441** -0.0448** -0.0455** -0.0419** 
 
(0.0204) (0.0207) (0.0138) (0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0307) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.5320*** 0.5309*** 0.5316*** 0.5440*** 0.5331*** 0.5432*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Acquirer Cash Holding 0.2364** 0.1965* 0.2183** 0.2365** 0.1794* 0.1792* 
 
(0.0274) (0.0538) (0.0373) (0.0275) (0.0825) (0.0820) 
Relatedness 0.0134 -0.0088 0.0026 -0.0012 -0.0066 -0.0048 
 
(0.8196) (0.8812) (0.9673) (0.9856) (0.9064) (0.9250) 
Intercept -0.6874** -0.4484 -0.3771 -0.3763 -0.3681 -0.6790** 
 
(0.0265) (0.1000) (0.1698) (0.1587) (0.1796) (0.0271) 
Ind Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Adj. R-sq 0.5328 0.5323 0.5221 0.5244 0.5587 0.5655 
 
Note: This table presents the relation between the operating performance and firm corporate 
governance (N-SOE sample). The dep. Variable is match firms adjusted ROA. Variable definitions 
are reported in Appendix A; Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity; p-values in 
parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05;*** p<0.01. 




  All SOE Non-SOE 
  DV: Adj. ROA24M 
Corporate Governance Variables 
  Independent Directors 0.2751** 0.2472 0.3615* 
 
(0.0391) (0.2390) (0.0765) 
Related Party Transactions  -0.0011** -0.0004 -0.0013* 
 
(0.0237) (0.3032) (0.0877) 
Managerial Ownership -0.0125 0.6199*** -0.0371 
 
(0.7537) (0.0028) (0.4962) 
CEO-Duality (0/1) -0.0027 0.0132 0.0248 
 
(0.8472) (0.5797) (0.3614) 
Shareholder Concentration 0.0011* -0.0006 0.0018* 
 
(0.0764) (0.2230) (0.0853) 
Control Variables 
   Cash Payment 0.0088 0.0168 0.0134 
 
(0.7840) (0.6711) (0.7519) 
Transaction Value 0.0240 0.0696*** -0.0152 
 
(0.2018) (0.0005) (0.6377) 
Acquirer Size (log) 0.0177** 0.0173* 0.0175 
 
(0.0332) (0.0733) (0.3072) 
Acquirer Tobin Q ratio 0.0089 0.0145 0.0103 
 
(0.3941) (0.2391) (0.5126) 
Acquirer price run-up -0.0157 -0.0135 -0.0124 
 
(0.1431) (0.1958) (0.4410) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.3399*** 0.1950*** 0.3969*** 
 
(0.0069) (0.0007) (0.0047) 
Acquirer Cash Holding 0.1049* -0.0107 0.1360 
 
(0.0724) (0.8800) (0.1538) 
Relatedness 0.0435 0.0501* -0.0179 
 
(0.1851) (0.0543) (0.6713) 
Intercept -0.7075*** -0.5004** -0.8593*** 
 
(0.0008) (0.0132) (0.0100) 
N 339 156 183 
Adj. R-sq 0.3517 0.3092 0.4008 
Ind Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: This table presents the robustness test on relation between the operating performance and firm 
corporate governance. The dep. Variable is match firms adjusted ROA 24 months following events. 
Variable definitions are reported in Appendix A; Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity; 





Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition/Measurement 
Acquirer Cash holding Acquirer’s cash & cash equivalent scaled by total assets 
Acquirer Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total noncash assets  
Acquirer price run-up Acquirer price run-up (pre-event 12 month BHAR) 
Acquirer size 
Acquire market capitalization (in Billions) at year end prior to acquisition 
announcements. 
Acquirer Tobin Q Acquirer Tobin’s Q at year end prior to acquisition announcements 
Cash Payment 
A dummy variable that equals one when payment is 100% cash and zero 
otherwise 
CEO Duality 
A dummy variable that equals one if CEO and Chairman are the same 
person and zero otherwise 
Independent director Percentage of independent directors on the board of directors 
Managerial Ownership 
Percentage shares of firm held by managerial team of acquirers prior to 
acquisition announcements 
Relatedness Acquirer and target are in same CSRC industry 
Related party transaction 
Number of related party transaction over previous 12 month, See (Chen, 
etc. 2012)  
Shareholder concentration Percentage shares held by top 5 shareholders 
Transaction value 
Deal transaction value scaled by acquirer total assets prior to acquisition 
announcements 
 
